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Metropolitan Trust Co. of Canada v.
Pressure Concrete Services Limited
By

HARTLEY

R.

NATHAN*

CONDITIONAL CONTRACTS - WAIVER OF A
TRUE CONDITION PRECEDENT - DAMAGES

An interesting decision has been rendered by Holland J. of the Ontario
High Court in the case of Metropolitan Trust Co. of Canada v. Pressure
Concrete Services Limited' raising three important questions. The first is
whether a purchaser, having reserved a general right of waiver in a conditional contract is free to waive what has become known as "a true condition
precedent". The second and third questions concern the right of a vendor, on
whom the obligation to satisfy a true condition precedent rests, to repudiate
a contract because the condition has not been fulfilled, and whether the court
may award damages against him on account of breach of this obligation.
The facts of the Metropolitan Trust case were somewhat complicated,
but can be summarized briefly. Metropolitan Trust, as purchaser, had entered
into an agreement of purchase and sale with Pressure Concrete, as vendor,
with respect to certain real property upon which was erected a freezer plant
under lease to Associated Freezers of Canada Limited. This lease had been
assigned to I.A.C., a mortgagee, as additional security.
The transaction was conditional upon the following: the vendor delivering to the purchaser I.A.C.'s consent to the surrender of the present lease
with Associated within ten days of execution of the agreement (paragraph 3);
and a new lease being entered into between the purchaser and Associated
effective from and after the closing date (paragraph 7). (The transaction
was in effect a sale of the property with a lease back, as the vendor and
Associated Freezers were related companies.)
Paragraph 15 of the agreement read as follows:
15. At such time as the conditions contained in Paragraph 3 hereof have been
fulfilled or complied with or have been waived by the Purchaser, this Agreement
shall constitute a binding contract of purchase and sale.

The agreement was executed on July 22nd, 1970 and the closing date
was set for August 14th, 1970 (paragraph 5).
Prior to the execution of the agreement the vendor's solicitor had
advised the purchaser's solicitor by letter that I.A.C.'s consent was reasonably assured. Subsequently, however, I.A.C. had decided to defer its
decision until it had considered the relevant documents. The purchaser's
solicitor delivered a draft lease to the vendor's solicitor on August 13th, 1970
which was then forwarded to I.A.C. in Montreal.
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Considerable correspondence passed between solicitors confirming a
number of extensions of the closing date, the last being to August 27th, 1970.
I.A.C. had not yet consented to the surrender of the existing lease but had
submitted the necessary documents to its solicitors for an opinion. On August
31st, 1970, the vendor purported to repudiate the contract: on September
2nd, 1970, the vendor's solicitor notified the purchaser's solicitor that as no
lease in satisfactory form had been presented to him prior to the last extended
closing date (August 27th, 1970), and since no further extension had been
agreed upon, the vendor was terminating the agreement.
The purchaser's solicitor then unilaterally fixed September 4th, 1970,
as the closing date, tendered and the tender was refused. The purchaser
thereupon issued a writ claiming specific performance and, in the alternative,
damages for breach of contract. A preliminary point came up for consideration, namely, whether the vendor could repudiate without reasonable notice
once the agreed closing date had passed. While the agreement was silent,
Holland J. was of the view that the parties originally intended time to be of
the essence; however, he held that since the vendor was not himself in a
position to close (apparently he had not prepared the necessary documentation) and since the closing date had been extended on a number of occasions
by mutual consent, it was unfair to categorically demand closing on August
27th. Time could be re-established to be of the essence only upon reasonable
notice to the purchaser; only thereafter could the vendor repudiate if the
purchaser would still be unable to close. In Holland J.'s words:
The vendor was not ready to close on August 27th for many reasons, quite apart
from the lack of consent of I.A.C. to the new head lease. The time having gone
by with neither party being in a position to close, the vendor could not give
immediate notice of repudiation but should have given reasonable notice of his
intention to repudiate should the conditions referred to in the contract not be
complied with or waived: see Iwanczuk v. Center Square Developments Ltd.,
[1967] 1 O.R. 447, 61 D.L.R. (2d) 193, and the authorities therein referred to
at p. 452 O.R., p. 198 D.L.R. A party who is himself in default cannot rely upon
time being of the essence to terminate the agreement. 2

The vendor, having lost the preliminary point, then argued that since
the condition precedent had not been fulfilled up to the date of trial, no
agreement came into being. From the fact of tender by the purchaser and
from the discussion of the relevant cases in the judgment, one can infer that
the purchaser was taking the position that it had waived the fulfillment of the
condition precedent. The agreement explicitly reserved his right of waiver.
Holland I. denied the purchaser's right to waive:
This provision as to waiver, in my view, does not assist the purchaser since I do
not see how the purchaser could waive, or purport to waive, this particular
3
condition.

If Holland J. meant to say by this that in no circumstances can a party waive
a true condition precedent where a general right of waiver has been reserved,
it is respectfully submitted he is wrong in law. A brief review of the relevant
authorities would appear to be in order.
2 (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 649 at 663, [19731 3 O.R. 629 at 643.
8 (1973), 37 D.LR. (3d) 649 at 664, [1973] 3 O.R. 629 at 644.

OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL

[VOL. 12, No. 3

Under Roman law4 a condition was distinguished from an actual term
of the contract and was considered an external fact upon which the existence
of the obligation depended. At common law, an obligation or right suspended
until the happening of a stated event was said to be subject to a condition
precedent. 5
In Turney v. ZhilkaG an agreement for the purchase of real property
contained a proviso that "the property can be annexed to the Village of
Streetsville and a plan is approved by the Village Council for subdivision!'.
Neither party undertook to fulfill this condition and neither reserved any
power of waiver. The vendors repudiated the contract because the annexation
condition had not been complied with; the purchaser sued for specific performance. At tria 7 Spence J., considering the condition to be simply and
solely for the purchaser's benefit, referred to the following statement of the
law in Fry on Specific Performance:
Where a contract contains stipulations which are simply and solely for the benefit
of the purchaser, and are severable, the purchaser may waive8 them, and obtain
judgment for specific performance of the rest of the contract.

He held that the condition could not be of any possible advantage to the
vendor and the purchaser had the power to waive the condition without a
reservation of such right. In his view, the test was "at whose instance and
demand the stipulation was included in the contract."9 However, in the
Supreme Court of Canada, Judson J., delivering the judgment of the Court
held that the purchaser could not waive this condition. He went on:
The obligations under the contract, on both sides, depend upon a future uncertain
event, the happening of which depends entirely on the will of a third party the Village council. This is a true condition precedent - an external condition
upon which the existence of the obligation depends. Until the event occurs there
is no right to performance on either side. The parties have not promised that it
of such a promise, there can be no breach of contract
will occur. In the absence 10
until the event does occur.

To the same effect is the case of F. T. Developments Limited v. Sherman.1 Here, without any reservation of waiver, an offer was conditional on
the approval of North York Council to a rezoning. It was held following the
Turney case that there was no unilateral right to waive the true condition
precedent.
In Genern Investments Limited v. Back12 the facts were similar to those
in Turney and F. T. Developments, save that the purchaser had reserved a
4 See Cheshire and Fifoot, Law of Contract (7th ed. London: Butterworth's, 1972)

at 127.
0 Id.
0, [1959] S.C.R. 582, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 449.
7 Sub nom. Zhilka v. Turney (1955), 7 D.L.R. (2d) 280, [1955] O.R. 213.
8 (1955), 4 D.L.R. (2d) 280 at 297, [1955] O.R. 213 at 229.
0 (1955), 4 D.L.R. (2d) 280 at 302, [1955] O.R. 213 at 235.
10, [1959] S.C.R. 578 at 583-4, 18 D.L.R. (2d) 447 at 450-1.
11 (1968), 70 D.L.R. (2d) 426.
12, [1969] 1 O.R. 694.
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right of waiver. Here Hartt J. considered that the existence of this right of
waiver meant that there was a "bilateral or agreed right of waiver" which
distinguished Turney and F. T. Developments; as such, the purchaser could
waive the condition. In his view:
The agreement itself expressly gave the purchaser a right of waiver and the
contract was thereby made conditional upon the municipality rezoning the land

unless so waived by the purchaser. . this power of waiver takes the condition
outside the realm of a true condition precedent for the purchaser was given an
express right by the vendor to relinquish that benefit. ...
Mhe rezoning condition did not form the basis for the completion of a contract because the parties
consented to the possibility of its waiver by the purchaser.' 3

In Barnett v. Harrison14 Thompson J. considered a situation where an
agreement was made conditional upon approval of land services, rezoning
and a site plan. The purchaser had reserved the right of waiver with respect
to only approval of land services. Referring to the condition subject to waiver,
he distinguished both the Turney and F. T. Developments cases, on the basis

that in both cases no right of waiver had been reserved. However, speaking
of the other conditions, Thompson J. stated:
Had it been desired by the parties that the right to waive the conditions by any
of them should exist, it would have been a simple matter to express the reserve
of such right in terms inserted into the contract, as was the situation in the case
of Genern Investments Limited v. Back .... 15

On appeal, the majority of the Court agreed with Mr. Justice Thompson's
disposition of the action; Jessup J.A. in dissent considered that the contract
contained an implied right of waiver for these remaining conditions. It is
clear from the majorty judgment that the conditions referred to in the agreement of purchase and sale were "true conditions precedent" within the
definition enunciated in the Turney case and in the absence of a specific right
of waiver could not be unilaterally waived by the purchaser. Conversely, the
result of the case is that it would have been possible for the purchaser to
reserve a right of waiver for even these "true conditions precedent".
It is respectfully submitted that, based on the above authorities, since
the purchaser in Metropolitan Trust had expressly reserved the right of
waiver, he could have waived fulfillment of both conditions referred to in
paragraphs 3 and 7 and insisted on taking the property subject to the old
tenancy arrangements. On the other hand, Holland J.'s statement may not
have been intended to be of general application, but rather confined to the
facts before the court. It appears that the purchaser had no intention of
waiving the condition as to I.A.C. consent. The transaction was desirable to
the purchaser only if it could be carried out in accordance with the offer,
that is, with the new lease arrangements. This implication is borne out by
two factors. First, a representative of the purchaser gave evidence'0 that
the transaction was attractive because of the nature of the new lease (a net
'R Id. at 699-700.
'4 (1973),

33 D.L.R. (3d) 272, afrg (1972),

22 D.LR. (3d) 29, [19711 3 O.R.

821.
'5

(1972), 22 D.L.R. (3d) 29 at 38, [1971]3 O.R. 821 at 830.

16 (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 649 at 657, [19731 3 O.R. 629 at 637.
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lease with no management problems), the yield to be expected on its investment and the fact that within 20 years the property would be owned free
and clear. The situation would have been vastly different if the present
tenancy were accepted with no change. Second, the purchaser asked the court
to order specific performance under court direction to require the vendor to
attempt to obtain I.A.C.'s consent (which the court refused to order). Our
conclusion is that what Holland J. really meant to say concerning the waiver
of a condition precedent was that the purchaser could not adopt a posture incompatible with the remedy requested by purporting to waive the I.A.C. consent and then asking the court for specific performance of the transaction,
including I.A.C. consent.
Since the purchaser herein could not waive the condition precedent, the
next question is faced squarely by Holland J.:
Did the vendor in the circumstances of this case, have the right to repudiate the
contract because this condition (LA.C.) had not been fulfilled?'7
The vendor had the obligation to deliver LA.C.'s consent to the surrender of
lease (paragraph 3) and until this was done, there was no "binding contract
of purchase and sale" (paragraph 15). After considering the relevant cases
(mostly on exercise of a power of rescission) His Lordship, concluding that
the vendor could not repudiate on this ground, remarked:
...

a party shall not take advantage of his own wrong, or of an event brought

about by his own act or omission.' 8

Holland J. came to this conclusion analogizing to the so called "doctrine
of the fundamental obligation"'1 which makes it clear that a party who has
by his conduct destroyed the whole of the contract can no longer rely on
one of its component parts, for example, an exemption clause in a contract.
Admittedly, the analogy is incomplete. The doctrine presupposes that a
contract is in existence; in the Metropolitan Trust case the agreement was a
conditional one only, depending for its existence on the satisfaction of a "true
condition precedent", namely, the I.A.C. consent to be obtained by the
vendor. To overcome this discrepancy, we must treat the cases involving conditional agreements as having two distinct stages: first, the "pre-agreement"
stage where a defined obligation or promise has been undertaken or given
and must be satisfied before the contract comes into effect (obtaining of
I.A.C.'s consent by the vendor); second, on completion of the first stage, the
carrying out of the remaining obligations under the contract, normally the
conveyancing aspects of a real estate transaction. A party having an obligation to perform in either stage may not take advantage of his own wrong,
i.e. his own non-performance, in an attempt to end the contractual relations
between the parties. (The situation is substantially different where neither
side promises to perform, e.g. the Turney case). In cases like Metropolitar'
Trust the appropriate party is obliged to use his best efforts to perform the
(1973), 37 D.LR. (3d) 649 at 664, [19731 3 O.R. 629 at 644.
[1973]3 O.R. 629 at 646.
1' Supra, note 4 at 119 et seq.; see also R.G. McLean Ltd. v. Canadian Vickers Ltd.
(1971), 15 D.L.R. (3d) 15, [1971] O.R. 207.
'7

18 (1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 649 at 666,
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condition; otherwise, he will be in breach of his obligations. Holland J.
specifically alludes to the minimal efforts made by the vendor to obtain
I.A.C.'s consent 20 and refers at length to the Court of Appeal decision in
Aldercrest Developments Ltd. v. Hunter2 1 Here, a transaction was conditional on Committee of Adjustment approval to a severance. The court
found that the vendor who had undertaken to seek the necessary consent,
was liable in damages for breach of an implied obligation to proceed with
the application for consent to land severance, or to give authority to the
purchaser so to proceed.
The Court seems prepared to award damages against a party who expressly or impliedly undertakes an obligation even in the pre-agreement
stage, and fails to accomplish or use his best efforts at performance.
Holland J. awarded damages on the basis of the increase in the value
of the property from the date of the purported repudiation of the contract
to the date of judgment. He refused to limit damages to those prescribed
by Bain v. Fothergil122 which would have given the purchaser only nominal
damages. Judgment was thereupon given for the purchaser with damages to
be assessed by the Master on a reference, with reference back to his Lordship
if further direction should be necessary.
The vague terms of the award raise the interesting question whether
damages were to be calculated upon the value of the land subject to the
present lease arrangements or what would have been the leasing arrangements had the contract been performed. Unfortunately, we are not given
details of the lease with Associated. Yet, it was clear from the evidence that
the purchaser was not prepared to purchase the property on the old lease
basis. It would, therefore, be anomalous to give damages based on the present
lease arrangements. Possibly His Lordship was considering only straight land
values: the difference would represent the quantum of damages without consideration to any particular leasing arrangements.
In conclusion, the Metropolitan Trust case shows that the party who
undertakes performance of an obligation must at any stage in the contractual
relationship be prepared to use his best efforts to perform such obligation,
failing which he may be held liable in damages. The measure of damages in
a case such as this should be the same as if he had performed all of his
obligations up to the date of closing and had simply refused to complete.
20

(1973), 37 D.L.R. (3d) 649 at 667, [1973] 3 O.R. 629 at 647.

21 (1970), 11 D.L.R. (3d) 439, [1970]2 O.R. 562.

As a matter of interest, in the Aldercrest case it appears that the local Planning
Board wrote to the vendor's solicitor after initial inquiries had been made to the effect
that there had been a resolution of that Board that in the event an application were
made for severance it would be their view that the subject land would be better
developed by an overall plan of subdivision. In effect, the Planning Board was saying
consent to severance would not be granted. No actual formal application to the Com-

mittee of Adjustment had been made by the Vendor.
22

(1874), L.R. 7 Hi,. 158.

